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Abstract 
 
Financial dollarization creates design problems for economic policy as increases the level of financial
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that we consider are: (i) increasing the risk of dollar deposits, reducing the level of coverage in the safety
net mechanism; (ii) increasing the relative volatility of inflation vis-à-vis real depreciation. Our results 
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1 Why we care about de-dollarizing the Peruvian economy? 
 
 
Peru is a highly dollarized economy (see Figure 1.1) and this fact imposes a series of 
restrictions to the monetary policy design and other aspects of economic policy in general 
(Baliño et al. (1999), Ize y Levy Yeyati (1998)). Notwithstanding, in the last decade in which 
a successful stabilization program was implemented, there were no special policies aimed to 
reduce the level of dollarization of the economy. This policy decision, that was clearly 
understandable at the beginning of the stabilization program as the country had no forex 
reserves, was maintained unaltered in the following years when the reserve position improved 
substantially. Even though inflation has been successfully controlled, the ratios of asset and 
liability dollarization remained almost the same (see Figure 1.2).  
 
This brings a point of which are the unintented consequences of a policy aimed to prop up 
the forex reserves position of the economy. As dollar deposits were encouraged, banks 
were forced in some sense to offer credits in dollars. The economy whose long term 
markets in soles were wiped out by the hyperinflation, were replaced by long term markets 
in dollars.  In this sense, the persistence of the asset substitution process might lead to the 
liability dollarization of firms. Financial intermediaries will easily match maturity and 
denomination of assets and liabilities, leading to an unsustainable high liability 
dollarization of firms.  
 
The dollarization literature has frequently suggested the need to tackle this issue given the 
entrenched risk for macroeconomic stability.  In particular, one of the main risks associated 
with a high and persistant financial dollarization is the balance sheet effect in the monetary 
transmission mechanism (Eichengreen, et al. (2002)). A large group of agents in the 
economy hold a high degree of dollarized liabilities, despite their earnings are denominated 
in domestic currency. In this group are not only firms producing non-tradable goods, but 
also the banking system and the government.  Therefore, the exchange rate risk could easily 
transform into default risk, increasing the stress for the financial system and enhancing the 
output effects of an external shock. An example of this was the combined impact of the 
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Asian and Russian crisis. As a consequence of the crisis, seven banks (out of 25) were 
intervened and closed. This closed correlation between the real exchange rate and the bad-
loans ratio supports our hypothesis (see Figure 1.3).2  
 
Figure 1.1 
Peru 1992-2003: Asset Substitution and Liability Dollarization Ratios 
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Another unintended consequence of the dollarization process is the set of trade-offs that 
imposes on the monetary policy design. Peru has recently opted for an inflation targeting 
framework. Does this policy decision will clash with the policy restrictions originated by 
the presence of balance sheet effects?  The Central Bank will always have to consider the 
possibility that a fully floating exchange rate might trigger devastating balance sheet 
effects. 
 
Despite all that, the analysis of dedollarizing options has been scant in the literature. Even 
in countries like Peru the issue has not been discussed analytically. Among the set of 
available options to face this situation we have on one side of the spectrum, policies aimed 
                                               
2 A detailed account of the financial crisis of those years could be found at Morón and Loo-Kung (2003). 
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to live along with the problem, either through setting explicit or implicit insurance 
mechanisms (a formal deposit insurance vs reducing the exchange rate volatility or ex-post 
bailing-out of banks in trouble). The optimality of these options is questionable given that 
they do not solve the problem, or increase it as they block an adequate appraisal of from 
economic agents.  
 
Figure 1.2 
Peru 1975-2002: Dollarization Ratio and Monthly Inflation Rate 
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Figure 1.3 
Peru 1994-2002: Real Exchange Rate and Bad-Loans Ratio 
80
85
90
95
100
105
110
115
E
ne
-9
4
Ju
l-9
4
E
ne
-9
5
Ju
l-9
5
E
ne
-9
6
Ju
l-9
6
E
ne
-9
7
Ju
l-9
7
E
ne
-9
8
Ju
l-9
8
E
ne
-9
9
Ju
l-9
9
E
ne
-0
0
Ju
l-0
0
E
ne
-0
1
Ju
l-0
1
E
ne
-0
2
Ju
l-0
2
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
0.12
Índice de Tipo de Cambio Real Cartera Atrasada / Colocaciones Brutas  
 
 5 
 
On the other side, we have policies with an explicit dedollarizing objective. As these are 
complex policies with many downside risks –in particular, reduce the level of financial 
intermediation-, countries have been reluctant to use them. The objective of this paper is to 
understand the causes of financial dollarization and evaluate policies oriented to reduce it 
within the context of the Peruvian economy. 
 
The paper is organized in the following way. In Section 2 we discuss the two main 
approaches to implement a dedollarization strategy. In Section 3 we present a simple 
analytical model to trace the fundamental causes of financial dollarization. In Section 4 we 
calibrate the model and simulate two policy options: altering the deposit insurance and 
increasing the relative volatility of inflation vis-à-vis real depreciation. Finally, in Section 5 
we conclude and suggest policy recommendations.  
 
 
2 How to de-dollarize an economy?  
 
A de-dollarization strategy should come from a good understanding of which factors caused 
the dollarization process. The literature emphasizes two approaches to understand the 
causes of financial dollarization3. The first branch suggests that portfolio considerations are 
behind agents’ decisions to maintain a dollarized portfolio of assests and liabilities. In the 
second approach, the main culprit are currency-blind regulations which fall short of 
distinguishing currencies, establishing a wrong set of incentives which generates a 
dollarized portfolio of assets and liabilities. 
  
The portfolio approach stresses the importance of the relative volatility of the inflation 
compared to real depreciation as a key determinant of financial dollarization. Ize y Levy 
Yeyati (1998) use an asset substitution model, CAPM (Capital Assets Portfolio Model), to 
formalize the previous statement. In particular, their model predicts that the degree of 
deposit and credit dollarization (given by the equilibrium in the loanable funds market) is 
given by the portfolio that ensures minimum variance. This portfolio is a function of the 
                                               
3 The recent policy review written by Levy-Yeyati (2003) provides a good summary of both approaches. 
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inflation and real depreciation volatilities. Thus, the minimum variance portfolio (MVP) is 
the natural reference point to measure the degree of financial dollarization and to link it 
with macroeconomic variables which might be influenced by policy decisions.  
 
Given the importance of second moments of the returns to explain the composition of 
depositors and creditors portfolio, an increase in the relative volatily of inflation (with 
respect to real depreciation volatility) will increase the dollarization ratio. This happens as 
this increase will reduce the coverage benefits rendered by assets denominated in domestic 
currency. Focusing the analysis in this relative volatility it is possible to explain a persistant 
and high financial dollarization ratio after a successful stabilization program. In fact, the 
MVP should not change if the stabilization policy comes with an exchange rate shock 
mitigation policy. 
 
The second approach underlines the role of the regulatory framework. If there is no 
discrimination against dollar deposits and a relatively high coverage under the deposit 
insurance scheme, the banking system will not internalize correctly the exchange rate risk 
in their pricing policy decisions.  
 
From the standpoint of a bank which finance part of its operations with dollar-denominated 
deposits in an environment marked by a high correlation between the exchange rate risk 
and the solvency of banks, the existence of a deposit insurance for dollar denominated 
deposits will lead to too-high passive interest rates for those liabilities.  Those interest rates 
should be priced netting out of the higher risk that comes with a larger exposition to 
exchange rate sudden depreciations. 
 
Moreover, and recognizing a highly significant correlation between exchange rate risk and 
the probability of default of creditors4, the existence of this type of insurance will create an 
incentive for financial intermediaries to avoid transfering all the exchange rate risk. Again, 
the result will be a lower active interest rate.  
 
                                               
4 Which is compatible with a high liability dollarization despite the presence of a large non-tradeable sector. 
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If the insurance covers a good part of the bank liabilities, the subsequent undervaluation of 
the exchange rate risk will lead to a lower spread for foreign currency operations, 
enhancing the attractiveness of deposits and credits in dollars.  
 
Besides the explicit coverage provided by the deposit insurance fund, the scenario 
described above could also be the end result of an implicit insurance provided by 
government bail-outs implemented to avoid systemic risk. This argument (so-called too-
many-to-fail, (Levy Yeyati (2003)) relies, precisely in the assumption that the government 
will have to intervene ex post (through debt buyout programs or capital strenghtining 
programs) to avoid a financial crisis.  
 
Besides the effect on the financial spreads, a symmetric regulation regarding asset 
denomination could have a direct impact on the portfolio decisions of depositors. If we 
focus only on the level of returns (hence assuming risk neutrality), the symmetric coverage 
for foreign and domestic currency deposits might introduce asymmetric effects in the 
expost return for both currencies. Once again, if we consider the high correlation between 
exchange rate risk and the financial system stability, a symmetric coverage would be 
guaranteeing that those saving in dollars perceive the higher capital gain associated with the 
exchange rate shock which precisely caused the need to use the insurance. 
 
The previous argument could be shown in Figure 2.1. The vertical axis measures the 
difference between the gross realized return of dollar and soles, whereas the horizontal axis 
the realized depreciation.  Lets define d* as the critical level of depreciation that triggers a 
default in the creditors, the liquidation of the bank and the need to use the insurance. A 
symmetric coverage would be guaranteeing a higher capital gain for dollar-denominated 
assets5. In such a setting, where bad states usually are associated with large depreciations, 
there are clear incentives to save in foreign currency. 
 
                                               
5 It should be expected that the critical level of depreciation will be diferent to the expected depreciation as we 
are considering an abrupt shock in the exchange rate. That is why we can talk about a ex post return 
differential of dollars vs soles different from zero. 
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If we introduce risk adverse agents, the presence of insurance (implicit or explicit) will 
change the perception about the exchange rate risk linked to the returns of dollar-
denominated assets. We will analyze this setup in detail in the next section as we will 
extend the model suggested by Ize and Levy-Yeyati (1998). 
 
 
Figure 2.1 
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3 The Portfolio Approach 
 
In this section we present some econometric evidence that enable us to focus on the dollar 
deposits instead of considering dollar credits. Given that we found a cointegration 
relationship between these two variables with the causality going from deposits to credits, 
we discuss a modified version of the Ize and Levy-Yeyati (1998) model incorporating some 
elements that will allow us to discuss some policy options to de-dollarize an economy. 
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3.1 From Asset Substitution to Liability Dollarization: A Cointegration 
Analysis  
 
Before discussing ways to de-dollarize an economy it is important to attempt to distinguish 
between demand and supply considerations behind the fact that Peru is a highly dollarized 
economy. With the exception of Ize and Levy-Yeyati (1998) the issue of financial 
dollarization has not been analyzed asset and liability dollarization at the same time.  
 
An empirical evaluation of this issue can be found in Barajas and Morales (2003). Using 
panel estimation with a sample of 14 Latin American countries, these authors find that 
deposit dollarization is a relevant variable when explaining the degree of loan dollarization.  
 
Taking the above into consideration, the objective of this section is to go beyond the 
assessment of deposit dollarization’s explanatory power and explore the existence of a 
stable relationship between this variable and credit dollarization and, most importantly, 
provide some evidence about the direction of causality between them. Regarding this issue, 
and if banks are to keep their balance sheets matched, one can argue that deposit and loan 
dollarization should exhibit not only a high correlation but that the former should cause the 
latter (in the sense of being a good predictor). A graphical exploration of their relationship 
seems to validate the first result related to this intuition (see Figure 3.1). 
 
In order to formalize this empirical regularity, a cointegration analysis was performed for 
the period December 1992 – March 2003 (see Appendix I and II). As revealed in the graph 
above, the presence of a stable relationship and the existence of a consistent error 
correction representation could only be identified for the period December 1992 – June 
1997. In particular, the Johansen test indicated the existence of a cointegration vector6 of 
the form (after normalizing for loan dollarization):  
 
ttt e)FCDEP(028.1035.0FCCRED ++-=     (1.) 
 
 
 
 
                                               
6 The null of zero cointegration vectors was rejected at the 1% significance level; the null of at most one 
cointegration vector was accepted at the 5% significance level. 
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where: 
 
DepositsTotal/DepositsCurrencyForeignFCDEP
CreditTotal/CreditCurrencyForeignFCCRED
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Figure 3.1 
Deposit dollarization, loan dollarization and external liabilities 
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As reveled in Table 3.1, all exogenous stationary variables appear significant and with the 
expected sign when explaining the evolution of credit dollarization. The most important 
result, however, is that the lagged error term from the cointegration vector is only 
significant (and with the correct sign) in the equation for credit dollarization. In other 
words, and in the event of a shock that deviates either variable from their equilibrium 
relationship, only credit dollarization will adjust to reestablish this equilibrium. Formally, 
the presence of a significant error correction term in the FCCRED equation only, implies 
that Granger causality could only be verified from deposit to loan dollarization. 
 
 
Table 3.1 
Estimated coefficients in the VEC 
(December 1992 – March 1997) 
 
Variable C et-1 D(Fccredt-1) D(Fcdept-1) 
D(FCCRED) 0.0010 (0.001) 
-0.3791 
(0.075)** 
0.1052 
(0.103) 
-0.1171 
(0.142) 
D(FCDEP) -0.0012 (0.001) 
-0.048 
(0.1055) 
-0.0940 
(0.145) 
0.0902 
(0.199) 
Variable  D(Volatt) D(Volatt-1) D(PBIt) D(SPRACT) 
D(FCCRED) 0.0110 (0.005)* 
0.0110 
(0.005)* 
0.0433 
(0.021)* 
0.0006 
(0.0003)* 
D(FCDEP) 0.0024 (0.317) 
0.0010 
(0.008) 
0.0013 
(0.030) 
-0.0003 
(0.0004) 
 
*   Indicates rejection of the null at the 5% significance level. 
**  Indicates rejection of the null at the 1% significance level. 
 
 
As mentioned above, the existence of a stable relationship and the evidence about causality 
from deposit to loan dollarization could only be validated for the sub-sample December 
1992 – June 1997. Not surprisingly, this cut-off period coincides with a significant 
acceleration in the evolution of the ratio of external liabilities (of the banking sector) to 
dollar denominated credit (see Graph 3.1). In fact, and to the extent in which external 
liabilities grow in importance as a source of funds for dollar denominated credit, one can 
expect that the relation between the latter and dollar deposits will become weaker.  
 
The results shown in this section serve our research effort in two ways. In terms of  policy 
implications, evidence seems to support the claim that reducing our dependence on foreign 
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funding will not only prevent external turmoil (as the one triggered by the Russian crisis in 
the second half on 1998) from translating into a local credit crunch, but will also allow us to 
restrict our attention to the supply side when implementing a dedollarization strategy.  
 
3.2 A portfolio model of deposit dollarization  
 
In this section we slightly modify the Ize and Levy-Yeyati (1998) minimum variance 
portfolio model. The fundamental change is to include in their specification the role of the 
deposit insurance in the portfolio decision of depositors. What we will show is how does 
this decision is modified compared to the benchmark model without deposit insurance. If 
the model is able to replicate the stylized facts of the Peruvian economy we will be able to 
simulate changes in the deposit insurance coverage, and in the relative volatility of inflation 
vis-à-vis real depreciation. 
 
We focus on the dollar deposits based on the results of the previous section. Given a stable 
long-term relationship between deposit and credit dollarization, the ECM results show us 
that credit dollarization adjusts to changes in the deposit dollarization. And this causality 
goes only in this direction. Therefore, our analytical focus would be on the incentives faced 
by fund suppliers. 
 
In addition, we consider that the model based on Ize and Levy Yeyati (1998) is a good 
starting point not only as links the optimal portfolio composition to fundamental variables, 
but also as includes the possibility of holding assets outside of the country. This is a key 
element if we are trying to adequately evaluate the possible effects of changes in the 
deposit insurance discriminating by currency denomination of domestically held deposits.  
 
In this sense, and following the definitions of the original model, the depositors’ portfoilio 
could be held in three assets: local currency deposits in the domestic banking system 
(DMN: H), foreign currency deposits in the domestic banking system (DME: F), and  
crossborder foreign currency deposits abroad (EME: C). The real returns of these three 
assets are given by: 
Hr , 
Fr  y 
Cr , respectively. 
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The original model includes a risk component associated with the stability of the financial 
system for all domestic deposits. However, this risk is considered to be orthogonal with 
respect to the exchange rate risk. As the authors recognize, we should expect that the 
degree of liability dollarization set the level of exposure of the financial system to a 
systemic risk in the event of sudden movements in the real exchange rate. By the same 
token, and given the high degree of liability dollarization in Peru, we linked the risk 
associated with the stability of the financial system to the exchange rate risk. We will see 
that the coverage of the deposit insurance will affect this risk component. 
 
With this is mind, the realized returns for each asset is given by: 
  
S
CC
CFS
FF
CH
HH
)r(Er
)r(Er
)r(Er
m+=
m+m+=
m+m-= p
      (3.) 
 
where, SHCCH ma-m=m  and SFCCF ma-m=m . Besides the shocks associated with 
inflation and real depreciation ( pm ) and ( Sm ), which affect DMN and DME, respectively, 
the returns over domestic deposits are subject to an additional risk component ( CHm ) and 
CFm ), which is the local risk. This risk is the combination of two components: the first one 
is an autonomous component ( Cm ) which captures the confiscation risk; the second 
component directly depends of the exchange rate risk and its influence will be relevant as 
far as financial system stability depends on real exchange rate fluctuations. As mentioned 
above, we will simulate changes in deposit insurance coverage. In particular, and for a 
given exchange rate risk exposure of the financial system, changes in the coverage ( Ha  and 
Fa ), will alter the impact on domestic asset returns. 
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As in the original model, and for simplicity we assume that all perturbations are distributed 
with mean zero and variance-covariance matrix equal to ij
S
, that satisfies 0SS CSC == p . 
Within the context of our model, this implies that the confiscation risk component is 
orthogonal with inflation or real depreciation shocks. However, and in contrast with the 
original model, this does not mean that there is no relationship between the exchange rate 
risk and the financial system stability risk. As we already mentioned, this relationship exists 
and it is captured by the second component of shocks affecting domestic deposits only. 
 
The next step is to define the depositors’ preferences, which are: 
 
2/)r(Varc)r(EU D-=     (4.) 
 
where r is the real average return of the portfolio and cD > 0 captures the degree of risk 
aversion of depositors. Therefore, the optimization problem consists in choosing the shares 
of each asset that maximizes U.  
 
Defining Fx , Cx  and CFH xx1x --=  as the shares of DME, EME, DMN, respectively, 
the first and second moments of the distribution of r are given by: 
 
)r(VarCx2Bx'x)r(Var
rw'x)r(E
H
H
++=
+=
   (5.) 
 
where: 
 
ú
û
ù
ê
ë
é
-
-=ú
û
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=
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x
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Using these expressions, the first orden condition is exactly as the one in the original 
model: 0CBxc/w D =++- . From this expression it is possible to find the optimal shares 
of dollar deposits, both domestically as abroad: 
 
wB)c/1(CB
x
x 1
D
1
C
F
-- +-=ú
û
ù
ê
ë
é
   (6.) 
 
The first term of (6.) correspond to the share of foreign currency deposits in the MVP (or 
the degree of underlying dollarization) and it will be the center of our attention in the 
following análisis. Lets define this underlying dollarization as l* and see which are its 
components alter we modified the model7. 
 
ú
û
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ê
ë
é
-
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û
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ê
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é
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=
-=l -
)r,rr(Cov
)r,rr(Cov
)rr(Var)rr,rr(Cov
)rr,rr(Cov)rr(Var
B
1
CB*
HHC
HHF
HFHCHF
HCHFHC
*
C
*
F
1
   
(7.) 
 
In (7.), the solution for l*F and l*C correspond to the shares of DME and EME in the 
minimum variance portfolio, respectively. 
 
Considering (3.), each of the elements in (7.) is given by: 
 
                                               
7 It is worth noticing that in the base model l* is given by 
SSS
S
S2SS
SS*
ppp
ppp
++
+=l . This expression let us ling the 
degree of dollarization to the relative volatility of inflation with respect to real depreciation. 
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CCSS
2
HHSH
HHC
2
SS
2
HFHSHF
HHF
1
2HCHFHC
SFSS
2
FHFF
HCHF
SFSSHFF
2
FCC
HC
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HFFH
HF
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))rr,rr(Cov()rr(Var(VB
SS)(V)rr,rr(Cov
S2S)22(SV)rr(Var
S)1(2SS))()(21(V)rr(Var
--a+a-a+-=-=
-a--aa+a--a=-=
----=
a+a-aa+a+=--
a+aa-a-a-+=-
a-a+++a-a+a-a+==-
ppp
ppp
p
p
ppp
  (8.) 
 
As could be derived from these expressions, including a local risk tied to the real exchange 
rate fluctuations has complicated the functional relationship between underlying 
dollarization and the volatilities of inflation and real depreciation8. Instead of showing an 
analytical solution we calibrate the new model and simulate it to analyze the effects of 
changes in the deposit insurance coverage and the relative volatility of the macroeconomic 
variables involved. 
 
 
4 Calibration and model simulation 
 
A numerical solution of the model requires to compute the variance of inflation ( ppS ), the 
variance of the real depreciation ( SSS ), the covariance between these two variables ( SSp ), 
the variance of the confiscation risk shock ( CCS ), and setting a value for Ha  and Fa . 
 
The first three were computed using annual variations of CPI, the real exchange rate for 
1993-2003. The confiscation risk and the coverage were calibrated to obtain consistent 
values of l*F and l*C.  
 
Considering that the simulation exercises will be based in assigning different values of Ha  
and Fa , we show how these parameters influence the variance of each component of the 
MPV. 
  
                                               
8 In order to obtain the expressions of the original model just set aH = aF = 0. 
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By definition, the portfolio variante is given by9: 
 
)r,r(Cov)xx1(x2)r,r(Cov)xx1(x2...
...)r,r(Covxx2)r(Var)xx1()r(Var)x()r(Var)x()r(Var
HCCFCHFCFF
CFCFH2CFC2CF2F
--+--+
++--++=
 
(9.) 
where: 
 
SSF
CF
SSHS
HC
CCSSFHSF
HF
SS
C
CCSS
2
F
F
SHSS
2
HCC
H
S)1()r,r(Cov
SS)r,r(Cov
SS)1(S)1()r,r(Cov
S)r(Var
SS)1()r(Var
S2SSS)r(Var
a-=
a--=
+a-a-a--=
=
+a-=
a+a++=
p
p
ppp
   (10.) 
 
Considering that the current deposit insurance offers a symmetric coverage for assets 
denominated in soles or dollars, we take as the starting point a scenario in which 
a=a=a FH . If we consider values of a  such that 1>a , it is easy to verify looking at the 
first equation of (3.), that we will be increasing the exposure to exchange rate risk for those 
deposits in domestic currency. That is why the numerical results yield an underlying 
dollarization (l*F + l*C) close to one, with a share for EME too high compared to 
historical data. Under this setup, a large part of the effects of different confiscation risks 
( CCS , the other variable that has to be calibrated) altered the distribution of dollar deposits 
(DME and EME ). As expected, a higher CCS  has almost no effect over (l*F + l*C) and it 
only translates into a transfer of dollar deposits from the domestic banking system to 
abroad. 
  
That is the reason why we establish a base scenario in which 01 >a> . In particular, and 
setting 4.0FH =a=a=a  and 3.8SCC =  we calibrate our base scenario with l*F = 0.712 
and  l*C = 0.118. Both values are consistent with current data.10. 
                                               
9 The reader will notice that this expression is equivalent to (5.). 
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4.1 The role of deposit insurance 
 
Before analyzing in detail the consequences of a symmetric coverage, it might be useful to 
summarize the effects on the underlying dollarization ratio (l*F + l*C) using a surface 
response as depicted in Figure 4.1. 
 
As the graph shows, a symmetric reduction in the coverage offered by the deposit insurance 
(a higher value of a=a=a FH ) will increase the underlying dollarization ratio. In fact, 
and using (10.), a higher a implies increasing the exposure to domestic currency deposits to 
the exchange rate risk. This effect (which increases the volatility of the domestic currency 
assets return) is unambiguous and for any value of a. However, the sign of the effect on the 
volatility of the DME returns is not always the same and it depends on the value of a. In 
particular, and for changes in the vicinity of the base scenario, increases in a will reduce 
the exposure of DME to exchange rate risk11. That is why there is a positive relationship 
between a  and the underlying dollarization ratio. 
                                                                                                                                                
10 The average observed shares of DME and EME between December 1994 and October 2002 are 69.9% and 
6.65%, respectively. It should be said that the data used to compute the share of EME only considers deposits 
held by Peruvians in the USA. Therefore, the estimate has a clear downward bias.  
11 The reader will notice that a higher exposure of the local risk to the exchange rate risk for foreign currency 
deposits could (as a gets close to 1) isolate the volatility of returns to real exchange rate fluctuations. This 
result comes from the fact that a higher profitability associated with a real depreciation gets compensated by a 
negative shock on the local risk component. For risk averse agents, this will increase the attractiveness of 
DME as a hedging mechanism against exchange rate risk.  
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Figure 4.1 
Underlying dollarization ratio: Surface response 
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Based on the previous argument, it is posible to extract a first conclusion: focusing on risk 
considerations a currency-blind regulation does not have to necessarily introduce a bias in 
favor of foreign currency denominated assets. In fact, the model predicts an inverse 
relationship between the degree of symmetric coverage and the dollarization ratio12.  
 
One of the main objectives of formulating this model was to explore the consequences of 
changing the symmetry of the deposit insurance. If we hold the coverage for domestic 
currency deposits inaltered ( 4.0H =a ), we plot in Figure 4.2 the response of the underlying 
dollarization ratio.  
                                               
12 Instead of contradicting the conclusions of Figure 3.1, the previous argument implies the existence of 
different responses depending on the level of risk aversion of depositors. If it increases, and variance 
considerations matter more, the results will be more in line with those predicted by this model. 
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Figure 4.2 
Response of dollarization ratio to different values  
of foreign currency deposits coverage 
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The reported results in Figure 4.2 might seem not very intuitive. When we increase the 
degree of exposure of DME to exchange rate risk, the representative (risk-averse) agent 
deemed as an optimal policy to increase the share of foreign currency deposits in his asset 
portfolio. However, if we look at each asset (l*F and l*C) separately we will see that 
deposits are being funneled out of the country (see Figure 4.3). 
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Figure 4.3 
Shares of DME and EME for different values of foreign currency deposits coverage 
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The above graph captures one of the main risks linked to a non-symmetric deposits 
insurance coverage: the disintermediation risk. In particular, the model predicts that, instead 
of reducing the ratio of dollarization, a lesser coverage for foreign currency deposits in the 
domestic banking system will end up in a massive deposit flight.  
 
As expected, when Fa  gets close to 1, a lower coverage for DME will reduce the share of 
DME (l*F)13. However, that reduction will not increase domestic currency denominated 
deposits but increase deposits held abroad. To understand whis result is crucial to consider 
the role of Fa  in the variance-covariance of each term (see (10.)) in the total portfolio 
volatility14. In general, we could say that given the increase in Fa , the EME would become 
a more attractive destination for all the DME withdrawn if the covariance of Hr  and Fr  
increase more (in absolute terms) than the covariance of Cr  and Fr . 
                                               
13 Starting from the base scenario (aF = 0.4), the initial increase in l*F responds to the argument mentioned in 
footnote 11. 
14 When aF changes, the composition of the MPV will change in order to guarantee that the partial derivative of 
the portfolio variance with respect to each share (xF, xC y xH) be the same (taking into account the contribution 
in variance and covariance). In other words, the new optimal portfolio will guarantee that there are no net profit 
(or loss) in variance terms of withdrawing one unit of wealth of an asset to be invested in another. 
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It is necessary to mention the role of including a third asset to obtain the above results. In a 
different setting in which it is only possible to save in soles or dollars in the domestic 
banking system, a reduction in deposit insurance coverage for dollars would have induced a 
change in the denomination of assets.  
 
 
4.2 The role of relative volatilities 
 
One of the main contributions of this model is that we can recover a simple functional form 
which relates directly the level of underlying dollarization with the relative volatility of 
inflation vis-à-vis real depreciation. The purpose of this exercise is to verify if this 
relationship holds after including the modifications of the model. In such a way, we would 
be able to determine if the policy recommendations of the original model are still valid 
within a context in which the local risk is tied with the exchange rate risk. 
 
The simulation was done multiplying the real depreciation volatility by a factor in order to 
lower the relative variance ( ppS / SSS ) by 10% in each new point15. With these new series 
we recalculate the value of SSS  and SSp  and obtain the associated dollarization ratios using 
the deposit coverage of the base scenario ( 4.0FH =a=a=a ).  
 
The results (see Figure 4.4) indicate that the conclusions of the base model hold. There is 
still a positive relationship between the underlying dollarization ratio and the ratio  
ppS / SSS . In particular, and coming from the base scenario ( ppS / SSS  = 3.97, l* = 0.829), 
for each 10% reduction in the relative variance, the dollarization ratio fall 0.5 percentage 
points. Even though this elasticity is not constant, it is possible to verify that the economy 
needs a three times more volatile real exchange rate to observe a 10% fall in the underlying 
dollarization ratio (see Table 4.1). 
 
 
                                               
15 The base scenario has a relative volatility ratio of 3.97. 
 23
 
Figure 4.4 
Underlying dollarization for different values of relative volatilities ( ppS / SSS ) 
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Table 4.1 
 
Factor (x) 
Spp / xSSS 
Relative  
variance  l* 
1.00 3.970 0.829 
3.19 1.246 0.725 
7.40 0.536 0.631 
23.59 0.168 0.526 
 
 
Finally, it is important to analyze the behavior of each component of the underlying 
dollarization ratio. In Figure 4.5, when the relative volatility is lower than the base scenario 
initially there is a portfolio reshuffle towards deposits denominated in dollars: wealth is 
transferred from EME to DME. As this transfer is not complete, the total dollarization ratio 
falls. If we abstract from the effects associated with covariance terms, and given the full 
exposure of EME to the exchange rate risk, it is easy to see that an optimal strategy when 
SSS increases is to reduce the share of assets abroad. Once those funds are depleted, and 
given the greater exposure of DME to exchange rate risk, any further increases in SSS will 
lead to a net gain in variance terms (lower portfolio volatility) if we move our wealth to 
domestic currency denominated deposits (DMN).  
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Figure 4.5 
Shares of DME and EME for different values of relative volatilities ( ppS / SSS ) 
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If we consider the variance terms in (10.) and the previous reasoning, the results will be 
sensititive to the level of deposit coverage offered by the deposit insurance. In fact, the 
potential effects of an increase in the volatility of the real exchange rate will depend on the 
exposure of each asset to the exchange rate risk. At that exposure will depend, in turn, on 
the value of a. Therefore, when domestic currency deposits face a higher exposure to the 
exchange rate risk (a higher a), increasing its share in the portfolio will augment the 
portfolio variance.  
 
This is shown in Figure 4.6, where we plot the sensitivity of l* when we change ( ppS / SSS ) 
for different levels of deposit coverage. According to the reasoning exposed, such 
sensitivity will depend positively on the level of coverage. In particular, and for 
0FH =a=a=a  we can see that the underlying dollarization ratio responds more 
drastically to changes in the relative variance. That is exactly the case of the original 
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model16.  Domestic currency assets are completely isolated from the exchange rate risk, that 
is why the agent decides to transfer his wealth to DMN when ppS / SSS  falls. Exactly the 
opposite happens when 2.1FH =a=a=a , where the higher exposure of DMN to the 
exchange rate risk make those a less attractive safe haven when SSS  increases.  
 
Figure 4.6 
Underlying dollarization for different values of relative volatilities and coverage 
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Before closing this section, it is important to explore how easy is to modify the ppS / SSS  
ratio by policy decisions. As inflation is one of the components of the real depreciation, the 
margin to influence the ralitive volatility will depend on the degree of association of both 
variables.  
 
Lets define e as the nominal depreciation and assuming that the external inflation rate is 
constant, the log-linear version of the real exchange rate could be expressed as: 
 
p-= es       (11.) 
                                               
16 Vale la pena notar que el ratio de dolarización subyacente reportado por el modelo en este caso (l* =0.74) 
es muy similar al presentado por Ize y Levy Yeyati  (0.78) al trabajar con datos históricos para el período 
1991-1995. 
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In order to link the variance terms of each variable, lets suppose that the inflation rate could 
be expressed by: 
eb-+b=p )1(e       (12.) 
where b is the pass-through coefficient (from the nominal exchange rate to the domestic 
price inflation) and e  measures the impact of real and monetary shocks over the domestic 
currency component of the consumption bundle of the representative agent. 
 
Using  (11.) and (12.), and assuming 0),e(Cov =e , it is easy to shown that: 
)(Var)1()e(Var)1(
)e(Var2)(Var)1()e(Var)e(Var
),e(Cov2)(Var)e(Var)s(Var
)(Var)1()e(Var)(Var
22
22
22
eb-+-b=
b-eb-+b+=
p-p+=
eb-+b=p
  (13.) 
 
Based on (13.) the effect of the pass-through coefficient on the possibility of influence the 
ratio ppS / SSS  by policies oriented to change the volatility of the nominal exchange rate. In 
particular, when the pass-through is high (b ® 1), increases in the variance of the nominal 
exchange rate will be transferred as increases in the inflation variance. The ensuing increase 
in ppS / SSS  will increase (instead of reduce) tbe underlying dollarization ratio. The opposite 
will happen in an scenario characterized by low pass-through, when the nominal exchange 
rate variance will be inversely related to the ppS / SSS  ratio
17. 
 
 
5 Concluding remarks 
 
When addressing the implications of high and persistent financial dollarization in emerging 
markets, the recent focus has turned to its negative prudential implications. In particular, 
and due to the currency mismatch that widespread deposit and loan dollarization brings into 
the economy, the main concern is the risk that the so-called “balance sheet effects” will 
amplify the impact of adverse external shocks on real variables. 
                                               
17 The Peruvian economy is characterized by a low pass-through coefficient. However and as noted by Morón 
and Winkelried (2003), that coefficient is not stable. 
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The need to pursue a dedollarization strategy is based on the above premise and the current 
literature provides us with a broad menu of policy options to counter this phenomenon. 
Regarding this issue, the preceding analysis has allowed us to focus our attention on the 
drivers of deposit dollarization and to privilege hedging considerations when explaining the 
composition of the depositors’ portfolio. 
 
In particular, and according to the intuition that suggests that supply considerations will 
dominate if banks are to keep their balance sheets matched, the empirical evidence favors 
the existence of causality from deposit to loan dollarization. This result was statistically 
validated with a cointegration analysis for the sub-sample December 1992 – June 1997, 
period in which a significant acceleration in the ratio of external liabilities (of the banking 
sector) to dollar denominated credit was observed. In this sense, a regulatory framework 
that prevents an excessive dependence on foreign funds will not only reduce our 
vulnerability to external shocks, but will also allow us to turn our attention towards 
depositor’s portfolio decisions when talking about the drivers of financial dollarization. 
 
Regarding these decisions, our extensions to Ize and Levy-Yeyati’s (1998) model show that 
a regulatory framework that differentiates among currencies via a reduction in the deposit 
insurance coverage for dollar assets, is not necessarily the best way to counter financial 
dollarization. In particular, and instead of luring depositors towards assets denominated in 
soles, funds will be transferred abroad. This implies not only that dollarization (in its 
broader sense) will not be reduced but that we face the risk of financial disintermediation.  
 
Policy recommendations that stem from our analysis point instead towards reducing the 
relative volatility of inflation to real depreciation. In this sense, it must be said that the first 
steps to achieve a reduction in this variance ratio have already been taken with the 
implementation of an inflation targeting scheme. However, and considering that the 
Peruvian evidence doesn’t favor the existence of a high pass-through coefficient, 
dedollarization efforts should now focus on reducing the implicit insurance granted by the 
existence of little real exchange rate volatility. The risk of this strategy stems from the fact 
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that the increase in real exchange volatility (required to reduce the attractiveness of dollar 
deposits) could end up triggering now the “balance sheet effects” which our dedollarization 
effort seeks to avoid in the future. 
 
In the light of the contrasting policy implications that stem from the different approaches 
that one can favor when implementing a dedollarization strategy, further research is 
required in order to determine the extent in which the proposed instruments, channels and 
associated risks can interact. In this sense, and to the extent in which we posses an 
analytical tool that explicitly addresses these policy options in an economy characterized by 
the presence of “balance sheet effects”, we would be able to account for both the need to 
pursue a dedollarization strategy and the effects of the available options that serve this 
objective.  
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 Appendix I 
 
Included observations: 53 after adjusting endpoints
Trend assumption: No deterministic trend (restricted constant)
Series: FCCRED FCDEP 
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 1
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test
Hypothesized Trace 5 Percent 1 Percent
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Critical Value
None * 0.338469 24.23491 19.96 24.6
At most 1 0.043107 2.335379 9.24 12.97
 *(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 5%(1%) level
 Trace test indicates 1 cointegrating equation(s) at the 5% level
 Trace test indicates no cointegration at the 1% level
Hypothesized Max-Eigen 5 Percent 1 Percent
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Critical Value
None ** 0.338469 21.89953 15.67 20.2
At most 1 0.043107 2.335379 9.24 12.97
 *(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 5%(1%) level
 Max-eigenvalue test indicates 1 cointegrating equation(s) at both 5% and 1% levels
 Unrestricted Cointegrating Coefficients (normalized by b'*S11*b=I): 
FCCRED FCDEP C
96.78973 -92.94764 -1.538279
13.5912 20.7734 -25.67931
 Unrestricted Adjustment Coefficients (alpha): 
D(FCCRED) -0.003937 0.000152
D(FCDEP) -0.00097 -0.00138
1 Cointegrating Equation(s): Log likelihood 389.61
Normalized cointegrating coefficients (std.err. in parentheses)
FCCRED FCDEP C
1 -0.960305 -0.015893
-0.07478 -0.05723
Adjustment coefficients (std.err. in parentheses)
D(FCCRED) -0.38102
-0.076
D(FCDEP) -0.093869
-0.09287  
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Appendix II 
 
 Sample(adjusted): 1993:02 1997:06
 Included observations: 53 after adjusting
        endpoints
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]
Cointegrating Eq: CointEq1
FCCRED(-1) 1
FCDEP(-1) -1.028009
(0.080540)
[-12.7634]
C 0.035423
Error Correction: D(FCCRED) D(FCDEP)
CointEq1 -0.379135 -0.048029
(0.075040) (0.105510)
[-5.05263] [-0.45520]
D(FCCRED(-1)) 0.105206 -0.094038
(0.102910) (0.144700)
[ 1.02233] [-0.64987]
D(FCDEP(-1)) -0.117091 0.09017
(0.141530) (0.199010)
[-0.82733] [ 0.45309]
C 0.000978 -0.00117
(0.000860) (0.001210)
[ 1.14078] [-0.97061]
D(VOLAT) 0.010572 0.002369
(0.005310) (0.007470)
[ 1.99110] [ 0.31728]
D(PBI) 0.043341 0.001269
(0.021250) (0.029880)
[ 2.03950] [ 0.04247]
D(SPRACT) 0.000641 -0.000306
(0.000260) (0.000360)
[ 2.47240] [-0.83839]
D(VOLAT(-1)) 0.010881 0.000944
(0.005470) (0.007690)
[ 1.98852] [ 0.12266]
 R-squared 0.582323 0.067104
 Adj. R-squared 0.517351 -0.078014
 Sum sq. resids 0.00121 0.002392
 S.E. equation 0.005185 0.007291
 F-statistic 8.962691 0.46241
 Log likelihood 208.0184 189.9534
 Akaike AIC -7.547863 -6.866164
 Schwarz SC -7.250461 -6.568762
 Mean dependent -1.00E-04 -0.000603
 S.D. dependent 0.007463 0.007022
 Determinant Residual Covariance 1.41E-09
 Log Likelihood 398.3748
 Log Likelihood (d.f. adjusted) 389.7024
 Akaike Information Criteria -14.02651
 Schwarz Criteria -13.35735  
